Date de l'exposé : 24 mars 2017
Attaques sur des conversions IND-CCA de systèmes basés sur les codes
Algorithms for secure encryption in a post-quantum world are currently receiving a lot of attention in the research community, including several larger projects and a standardization effort from {NIST}. One of the most promising algorithms is the code-based scheme called QC-MDPC, which has excellent performance
and a small public key size.
In this work we present a very efficient key recovery attack on the QC-MDPC scheme using the fact that decryption uses an
iterative decoding step and this can fail with some small probability. We identify a dependence between the secret key and
the failure in decoding. This can be used to build what we refer to as a distance spectrum for the secret key, which is the set
of all distances between any two ones in the secret key. In a reconstruction step we then determine the secret key from the distance spectrum.
The attack has been implemented and tested on a proposed instance of QC-MDPC for 80 bit security. It successfully recovers the secret key in minutes.
A slightly modified version of the attack can be applied on proposed versions of the QC-MDPC scheme that provides IND-CCA security. The attack is a bit
more complex in this case, but still very much below the security level. The reason why we can break schemes with proved CCA security is that the model for these proofs typically does not include the decoding error possibility.
