Date de l'exposé : 19 décembre 2023 (10h - Salle Métivier à INRIA)
inscription préalable obligatoire auprès de isobelle.kelly@inria.fr. Bagage ou sac interdit.
Soutenance de thèse, Side-Channel Resistance of Cryptographic Primitives Based on Error-Correcting Codes
For about three decades, we have been aware of attacks targeting implementations of cryptosystems, exploiting physical information such as execution time. Naturally, questions arise about the threats these attacks pose to the upcoming industry deployments of post-quantum schemes.
In this thesis, we focus on the resistance of error-correcting code-based cryptographic algorithms against side-channel attacks. We specifically studied two schemes, ROLLO and BIKE, which were candidates for the second round of post-quantum standardization organized by NIST.
Through our research, we demonstrate that their constant-time implementation is notably vulnerable to attacks using power consumption analysis. To demonstrate these vulnerabilities, we employ techniques such as machine learning and linear algebra. Furthermore, for both scheme, the attack requires a single trace of power consumption to recover the private key.
Following the identification of these vulnerabilities, we propose countermeasure strategies to prevent these attacks while maintaining constant-time operation.
