

Algebraic Techniques to solve the Regular Syndrome Decoding Problem

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Decoding Problem (DP) over \mathbb{F}_q (aka Primal LPN)

Given full-rank $\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{k \times n}$, distinguish

- $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{m}\mathbf{G} + \mathbf{e}$, $\mathbf{m} \in \mathbb{F}_q^k$, error $\mathbf{e} \sim \chi$
- $\mathbf{y} \sim \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{F}_q^n)$

$$\begin{array}{c} \mathbf{m} \mathbf{G} + \mathbf{e} \\ \approx \\ \mathbf{y} \end{array}$$

Bounded number of samples $n = k^{1+\alpha}$, $0 < \alpha < 1$

Error \mathbf{e} of low Hamming weight, $|\mathbf{e}| = t$

→ Coding theory point of view ! Length n , dim. k , code rate $R \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} k/n$

Underlying code \mathcal{C}


$$\mathcal{C} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{m\mathbf{G}, m \in \mathbb{F}_q^k\} = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n, \mathbf{x}\mathbf{H}^T = \mathbf{0}\}, \mathbf{H} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(n-k) \times n}$$

“Philosophical” difference ? Error distribution χ

Syndrome Decoding (SD) Problem (aka Dual LPN)

Given full-rank $H \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(n-k) \times n}$, distinguish

- $u = eH^T \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n-k}$, $e \sim \chi$
- $u \sim \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{F}_q^{n-k})$



Some use cases

- Symmetric crypto [HB01]
- PKE: Alekhovich scheme [Ale03]

Pseudorandom correlation generators (PCGs): correlated randomness [Boy+19]

- PRG $(m, e) \mapsto mG + e$ or $e \mapsto eH^T$ (correlated seeds) + Function Secret Sharing
- used to build secure MPC, ZK proofs ...

Non-standard parameters

LOW noise (inverse poly, not constant) \rightarrow Very large sizes

Possibly large field (typically $\mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}$)

ex: $\lambda = 128$ over \mathbb{F}_2 , $(n = 2^{22}, k = 67440, t = 4788)$ [Boy+19]; [Liu+22]

Assume $n = N \times t$ for some $N \in \mathbb{N}$ (blocksize)

Regular distribution [AFS05]

- For $1 \leq i \leq t$, sample $\mathbf{e}_i \in \mathbb{F}_q^N$ random of weight 1
- Final error is $\mathbf{e} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\mathbf{e}_1, \dots, \mathbf{e}_t) \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$

Introduction in Secure Computation [Haz+18]

Now used in many protocols [Boy+19]; [Wen+20]; [Yan+20] ...

→ Reduce Function Secret Sharing cost

[AFS05] Augot, Finiasz, and Sendrier. "A Family of Fast Syndrome Based Cryptographic Hash Functions". *MYCRYPT 2005*.

[Haz+18] Hazay et al. *TinyKeys: A New Approach to Efficient Multi-Party Computation*.

Attacks on Plain SD ! Do NOT exploit regular distribution:

- “Folklore attack” and ISD algorithms [Pra62]; [MMT11]; [MO15]...
- Statistical Decoding [Jab01]
(recently improved by [Car+22])

What about algebraic techniques ?

[Pra62] Prange. “The use of information sets in decoding cyclic codes”.

[Jab01] Jabri. “A Statistical Decoding Algorithm for General Linear Block Codes”.

[Car+22] Carrier et al. *Statistical Decoding 2.0: Reducing Decoding to LPN*.

Generic technique in cryptanalysis:

- Model scheme or hard problem as polynomial system
- Solve it ! (Gröbner Bases, linearization)

1st algebraic attack on RSD

- competitive for very small code rates \leftrightarrow enough samples
- algebraic system + detailed analysis

(Naive) algebraic system

Modeling regular structure

Polynomial ring $R \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbb{F}_q[(e_{i,j})_{i,j}]$ in n variables, block $\mathbf{e}_i \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (e_{i,1}, \dots, e_{i,N}) \in \mathbb{F}_q^N$

Coordinates $\in \mathbb{F}_q$ (field equations)

$$\forall i, \forall j, e_{i,j}^q - e_{i,j} = 0. \quad (1)$$

One $\neq 0$ coordinate per block

$$\forall i, \forall j_1 \neq j_2, e_{i,j_1} e_{i,j_2} = 0. \quad (2)$$

Over \mathbb{F}_2 , this coordinate is 1

$$\forall i, \sum_{j=1}^N e_{i,j} = 1. \quad (3)$$

We consider quadratic system $\mathcal{Q} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (1) \cup (2) \cup (3)$

Adding parity-check equations

Linear equations in the $e_{i,j}$'s from $\mathbf{eH}^T = \mathbf{u}$:

Parity-checks

$$\mathcal{P} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{ \forall i \in \{1..n-k\}, \langle \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{h}_i \rangle - u_i = 0 \}.$$

Final system $\mathcal{S} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{Q}$.

Set of solutions to \mathcal{S} = Set of solutions to RSD (let's say 1)

Cost of System Solving !


- Known for random systems (or at least for well-studied ones)
- \mathcal{S} neither random nor well-studied ...

Solving Algorithms

1. multiply eqs by all monomials μ :
→ polys μf_i , f_i initial eq
2. store them in matrix, fixed degree $d = \deg(\mu f_i)$
3. do linear algebra

Macaulay matrix M_d

Matrix of size $\exp(d)$



What do we need ?

Highest degree $d = D$ for a Macaulay matrix

Analyzing \mathcal{S}

Recall that $\mathcal{S} = \underbrace{\{\text{parity-checks}\}}_{\mathcal{P}} \cup \underbrace{\{\text{regular structure}\}}_{\mathcal{Q}}$

$$\mathcal{P} = \{\forall i \in \{1..n-k\}, \langle \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{h}_i \rangle - u_i\}$$

$$\mathcal{Q} = \{\forall i \in \{1..t\}, \forall j \in \{1..N\}, e_{i,j}^2 - e_{i,j}\} \cup \{\forall i, \forall j_1 \neq j_2, e_{i,j_1} e_{i,j_2}\} \cup \{\forall i, \sum_{j=1}^N e_{i,j} - 1\}$$

- To keep internal structure, **treat \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{Q} separately**
- Focus on **homogeneous parts**: $\langle \mathcal{S}^{(h)} \rangle = \langle \mathcal{P}^{(h)} \rangle + \langle \mathcal{Q}^{(h)} \rangle$

Highest degree from Hilbert Series

Polynomial ring $R \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbb{F}_q[[e_{i,j}]_{i,j}]$, $R = \bigoplus_{d \in \mathbb{N}} R_d$ hom. components

Hom. ideal $I \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle f_1, \dots, f_m \rangle$, $I_d \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} I \cap R_d$

Hilbert Series (HS) of I

Contains **properties of I we need** (in particular highest degree D)

→ Find Hilbert Series for $\langle \mathcal{S}^{(h)} \rangle$ then deduce D

Formal definition:

$$\mathcal{H}_{R/I}(z) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{d \in \mathbb{N}} \dim(R_d/I_d) z^d$$

0-dimensional ideal ($\mathcal{H}_{R/I}(z)$ is a polynomial): $H(I) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \min \{ \delta \in \mathbb{N}, I_\delta = R_\delta \}$ (index)

Only depends on regular distribution. We analyze $q = 2$ (e.g. we can use (3))

$$\mathcal{Q}^{(h)} = \underbrace{\{\forall i \in \{1..t\}, \forall j \in \{1..N\}, e_{i,j}^2\}}_{(1)} \cup \underbrace{\{\forall i, \forall j_1 \neq j_2, e_{i,j_1} e_{i,j_2}\}}_{(2)} \cup \underbrace{\{\forall i, \sum_{j=1}^N e_{i,j}\}}_{(3)}$$

HS 1

We have $\dim(R_d / \langle \mathcal{Q}^{(h)} \rangle_d) = \binom{t}{d} (N-1)^d$. Thus,

$$\mathcal{H}_{R / \langle \mathcal{Q}^{(h)} \rangle}(z) = (1 + (N-1)z)^t$$

Proof (monomial counting).

Using (1) and (2), squarefree + at most one variable per \mathbf{e}_i block

Using (3), we get rid of one variable per \mathbf{e}_i block □

We have $\mathcal{P}^{(h)} = \{\mathbf{e}\mathbf{H}^T\}$. By assumption on \mathbf{H} , “random” linear equations

- but we want “randomness” in $R/\langle Q^{(h)} \rangle$
- here, randomness means (semi)-regularity:

Semi-regularity over \mathbb{F}_2 [Bar04]

Let $S \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbb{F}_2[\mathbf{e}]/\langle \mathbf{e}^2 \rangle$, $\mathcal{F} = \{f_1, \dots, f_m\}$ homogeneous, 0-dim, index $d_{\langle \mathcal{F} \rangle}$

System \mathcal{F} is semi-regular over \mathbb{F}_2 if $\langle \mathcal{F} \rangle \neq S$ and if

$$\forall i, \deg(g_i f_i) < d_{\langle \mathcal{F} \rangle}, g_i f_i = 0 \in S/\langle f_1, \dots, f_{i-1} \rangle \Rightarrow g_i = 0 \in S/\langle f_1, \dots, f_i \rangle \quad (4)$$

In this paper, we adapt it to $R/\langle Q^{(h)} \rangle$ instead of $R/\langle \mathbf{e}^2 \rangle$

[Bar04] Bardet. “Étude des systèmes algébriques surdéterminés. Applications aux codes correcteurs et à la cryptographie”.

Combining everything

Semi-regular HS are known ! (write exact sequences from (4))

Assumption

We **assume** semi-regularity of $\mathcal{P}^{(h)}$ with our new definition

We have $\langle \mathcal{S}^{(h)} \rangle = \langle \mathcal{P}^{(h)} \rangle + \langle \mathcal{Q}^{(h)} \rangle$, we know $\mathcal{H}_{R/\langle \mathcal{Q}^{(h)} \rangle}$. We want $\mathcal{H}_{R/\langle \mathcal{S}^{(h)} \rangle}$

Under Assumption, we get

$$\mathcal{H}_{R/\langle \mathcal{S}^{(h)} \rangle}(z) = \frac{\mathcal{H}_{R/\langle \mathcal{Q}^{(h)} \rangle}(z)}{(1+z)^{n-k}}$$

HS for $\mathcal{S}^{(h)}$ (under Assumption + using HS 1)

$$\mathcal{H}_{R/\langle \mathcal{S}^{(h)} \rangle}(z) = \frac{(1 + (N-1)z)^t}{(1+z)^{n-k}}$$

Solving \mathcal{S} (more concretely)

- **Dense** linear algebra on Macaulay matrix $\mathbf{M}_D \rightarrow$ row ech. form
- Cost **exponential in D** , $2 \leq \omega < 3$:

$$T_{\text{solve}}(\mathcal{S}) = \mathcal{O}(\#\text{cols}(\mathbf{M}_D)^\omega) = \mathcal{O}\left(\binom{t}{D}^\omega (N-1)^{\omega D}\right)$$

Highest degree D from HS

Index of **first < 0 coef.** in $\mathcal{H}_{R/\langle \mathcal{S}^{(h)} \rangle}$

+ “Degree fall assumption”: **same D for $\mathcal{S}^{(h)}$ and \mathcal{S}**

Hybrid approach I

Conjectured D may be **too high** to be practical

Hybrid approach (folklore & [BFP10])

Fix f variables + solve specialized system $\mathcal{S}_{\text{spec},f}$

Hope: smaller D for $\mathcal{S}_{\text{spec},f}$

→ Guess $f \geq 0$ zero positions in \mathbf{e} (as Prange but $f \ll k$)

- Simplest way: $u \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} f/t$ per block, success proba $\left(\frac{\binom{N-1}{u}}{\binom{N}{u}}\right)^t = (1 - u/N)^t$

Cost of solving $\mathcal{S}_{\text{spec},f}$? Same assumptions as for \mathcal{S} , same analysis:

$$\mathcal{H}_{R/\langle \mathcal{S}_{\text{spec},f}^{(h)} \rangle}(z) = \frac{(1 + (N - 1 - u)z)^t}{(1 + z)^{n-k}}$$

Final complexity:

$$\mathcal{O} \left(\min_{0 \leq u \leq N-1} \left\{ (1 - u/N)^{-t} \times T_{\text{solve}}(\mathcal{S}_{\text{spec},u \cdot t}) \right\} \right)$$

- Other ways to fix zeroes (inspired by ISDs ?). We analyze one more in the paper.

From Dense to Sparse (under the carpet)

Use **sparse** linear algebra: $\searrow T_{\text{solve}}(\cdot)$?

- Need **XL-Wiedemann** instead of Gröbner Basis
- **Kernel** of **affine Macaulay matrix**

XL at conjectured D may fail !

(need other parameter attached to affine systems: *witness degree*)

We relied on Magma

- Check Assumption: compute HS for both $\mathcal{S}^{(h)}$ and $\mathcal{S}_{\text{spec},f}^{(h)}$ (various f)
- Check Degree Fall assumption: steps of Magma's F4 on affine system
- To do: show that XL can work

Conclusion

Conjectured cost with Wiedemann

Parameters from Boyle *et al.* [Boy+19], updated analysis by Liu *et al.* [Liu+22]

Large field: no more $\{\forall i, \sum_{j=1}^N e_{i,j} = 1\}$, fields eqs of high degree (**that's ok**)

n	k	t	\mathbb{F}_2 [Liu+22]	This work \mathbb{F}_2	$\mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}$ [Liu+22]	This work $\mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}$
2^{22}	64770	4788	147	104	156	111
2^{20}	32771	2467	143	<u>126</u>	155	<u>131</u>
2^{18}	15336	1312	139	<u>123</u>	153	<u>133</u>
2^{16}	7391	667	135	141	151	151
2^{14}	3482	338	132	140	150	152
2^{12}	1589	172	131	136	155	<u>152</u>
2^{10}	652	106	176	146	194	<u>180</u>

[Liu+22] Liu et al. *The Hardness of LPN over Any Integer Ring and Field for PCG Applications.*

- Sometimes beats Gauss/ISDs for low rates (Primal LPN)
- Zone with “constant” deg. $D \rightarrow$ polynomial algorithm ?

Similar to Arora-Gê modeling on LWE [AG11]
(Polynomial for sufficiently many samples)