

# Differential and Linear Properties of FCSRs

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# Introduction

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- LFSRs widely used in cryptography
- But linearity  $\Rightarrow$  weaknesses
- FCSRs as an alternative

What we propose here :


- identify some differential biases
- explain what we want to do about linear biases

# Summary

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- 1 Introducing FCSRs
- 2 Differential Properties
  - Bitwise Bias in the FCSR
  - Going through the Filter
- 3 Linear Properties



## From LFSRs to FCSRs



LFSRs:

- modulo 2 addition

## From LFSRs to FCSRs




LFSRs:

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FCSRs:

- addition with carry

## From LFSRs to FCSRs




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FCSRs:

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- *quadratic* transition function

## From LFSRs to FCSRs




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## From LFSRs to FCSRs



LFSRs:

- modulo 2 addition
- linear transition function
- $m$ -sequence
- rational power series

$$\sum m(t)X^t = \frac{P(X)}{Q(X)}$$


FCSRs:

- addition with carry
- *quadratic* transition function
- $l$ -sequence
- rational 2-adic numbers

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
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Both:


- known period
- good statistical properties

# Ring FCSR

- Galois : one to many




- Fibonacci : many to one




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
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


- Ring : any to any




⇒ Same connection integer but better diffusion

## F-FCSRs Stream Ciphers




- Apply a linear filter to the main register
- Linearity  $\Rightarrow$  highly (correlation) resilient, breaks the 2-adic structure
- As usual, the first bits of the stream are discarded

## F-FCSRs as a Round-Function/Sbox




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
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- 1 Load the input in the main register – possibly padded
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## F-FCSRs as a Round-Function/Sbox



- 1 Load the input in the main register – possibly padded
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- 3 Clock the FCSR enough time to ensure full diffusion
- 4 Extract and Clock until enough bits are outputted



# Summary

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- 1 Introducing FCSRs
- 2 Differential Properties
  - Bitwise Bias in the FCSR
  - Going through the Filter
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## Notations and Goal

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Notations :

- $m$  an input message
- $\delta$  a differential
- $m' = m + \delta$ 
  - Note that if  $Supp(m) \cap Supp(\delta) = \emptyset$  then  $m' = m \oplus \delta$ .

For  $x \in \{m, \delta, m'\}$

- $x_i(t)$  the  $i$ -th bit of  $x$  after  $t$  clocks of the FCSR
- $X_i$  the 2-adic serie associated with  $x_i = x_i(0)$ , e.g.  $\Delta_i = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta_i(t)2^t$

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

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### Goal

Estimate the probability  $\Pr[m'_i(r) \oplus m_i(r) \oplus \delta_i(r) = 1]$ .



## Adding with carry

- FCSR linear toward  $+$   $\Rightarrow M'_i = M_i + \Delta_i$
- Hence  $m'_i(r)$  can be computed with an adder with carry:



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

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- $\Pr[m'_i(r) \oplus m_i(r) \oplus \delta_i(r) = 1] = \Pr[c_i(r-1) = 1]$
- Linear recurrence between  $\Pr[c_i(r-1) = 1]$  and  $\Pr[c_i(r-2) = 1]$

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


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### Result


$$\Pr[m'_i(r) \oplus m_i(r) \oplus \delta_i(r) = 1] = \frac{1}{2^r} (\Delta_i \bmod 2^r)$$

## Simulation on a small FCSR



- connection integer  $q = 347$
- diameter  $d = 5$  (full diffusion)
- clocked  $r = d + 4 = 9$  times

## Simulation on a small FCSR




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	$\Pr[m'_i(r) \oplus m_i(r) \oplus \delta_i(r) = 1]$ with $\delta = (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$							
	bit 0	bit 1	bit 2	bit 3	bit 4	bit 5	bit 6	bit 7
theoric	0.660	0.830	0.195	0.438	0.219	0.109	0.859	0.320
observed	0.656	0.828	0.203	0.461	0.227	0.117	0.867	0.313
difference ( $\times 10^{-2}$ )	0.391	0.195	0.781	2.34	0.781	0.781	0.781	0.781

⇒ Small difference between theory and observation



# The GLUON-64 FCSR



18 blocs of 8 bits  
 FCSR of 144 bits  
 + 73 bits of carries

## Simulation on the GLUON-64 FCSR

---

GLUON : lightweight hash function family based on the sponge construction and FCSRs.

- size  $n = 144$  bits with  $\ell = 73$  carry bits
- connection integer  
 $q = 27013336179990468777742546164977981767038829$
- diameter  $d = 29$
- clocked  $r = d + 4 = 33$  times

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	$\Pr[m'_i(r) \oplus m_i(r) \oplus \delta_i(r) = 1] \text{ with } \delta = (1, 0, 0, \dots, 0)$							
	bit 0	bit 1	bit 2	bit 3	bit 120	bit 121	bit 122	bit 123
theoric	0.623	0.868	0.329	0.402	0.817	0.308	0.214	0.402
observed	0.632	0.875	0.330	0.392	0.815	0.323	0.219	0.399
diff. ( $\times 10^{-2}$ )	0.928	0.671	0.0794	1.07	0.232	1.58	0.476	0.281

Again, small difference between theory and observation

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## A famous lemma

---

The linear filter :

- denoted  $f$ ,
- xors some of the  $m_i(r)$ ,
- output a single bit  $s(r) = f(m(r))$

## A famous lemma

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
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But :


- $\Pr[m'_i(r) \oplus m_i(r) \oplus \delta_i(r) = 1]$  known for indices  $i$  at the filter input
- Matsui's *Piling-up lemma*  $\Rightarrow \Pr[f(m'(r)) \oplus f(m(r)) \oplus f(\delta(r)) = 1]$

## Simulation on the small FCSR



- connection integer  $q = 347$
- clocked  $r = 9$  times
- 4-bit filter  $f(m) = m_1 \oplus m_2 \oplus m_5 \oplus m_6$

## Simulation on the small FCSR



- connection integer  $q = 347$
- clocked  $r = 9$  times
- 4-bit filter  $f(m) = m_1 \oplus m_2 \oplus m_5 \oplus m_6$

Differential $\delta$	$\Pr[f(m'(r)) \oplus f(m(r)) \oplus f(\delta(r)) = 1]$		
	Theoric	Observed	Difference ( $\times 10^{-2}$ )
(1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)	0.491	0.516	2.43
(0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)	0.387	0.391	0.357
(0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)	0.483	0.547	6.34
(0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0)	0.458	0.438	2.08

Problem : the bias toward  $1/2$  may be of wrongly signed.



## Simulation on the GLUON-64 FCSR

---

- size  $n = 144$  bits with  $\ell = 73$  carry bits
- connection integer  
 $q = 27013336179990468777742546164977981767038829$
- clocked  $r = 33$  times
- filter  $f : \mathbb{F}_2^{96} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^8$

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	$\Pr[f(m'(r)) \oplus f(m(r)) \oplus f(\delta(r)) = 1]$ with $\delta = (1, 0, 0, \dots, 0)$				
	bit 0	bit 1	bit 2	bit 3	bit 4
theoric	0.499961	0.504082	0.496059	0.500014	0.500464
observed	0.500000	0.498047	0.483887	0.496094	0.502930
difference ( $\times 10^{-2}$ )	0.00386238	0.603485	1.21722	0.392056	0.246525

Same Problem : the bias toward 1/2 may be of wrongly signed.

## Can this break GLUON?

---

- Problem with the bias sign
- Bias changes with each clock of the FCSR / each outputted word
- GLUON design  $\Rightarrow$  differential only on the first input word
- Difficult to reverse the FCSR

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## What exists...

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Paper of Tian Tian and Wen-Feng Qi : Linearity properties of binary FCSR sequences, vol. 52 of *Design, Codes and Cryptography* (2009).

- Large linear bias based on low-weight multiple of the connection integer  $q$

E.g.:

- $\ell$ -sequence  $\sum a(t)2^t$
- bias of  $a(t+u) \oplus a(t+v) \oplus a(t) = a(t+r)$
- $p = 2^r + 2^{r-u} + 2^{r-v} - 1$
- $q|p \Rightarrow$  large bias (about  $\frac{1}{3}$ )

## ... And what we want to do

---

Tian and Qi:

- One  $\ell$ -sequence:

$$\sum a(t)2^t$$

- Temporal bias:

$$a(t+u) \oplus a(t+v) \oplus \dots = 0$$

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Us:

- Multiple  $\ell$ -sequences:  
 $\sum m_i(t)2^t$
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Why it might work:

- Convert the spatial back to temporal
- Every  $\ell$ -sequences  $\sum m_i(t)2^t$  : temporal shifts of a single  $\ell$ -sequence



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- Every  $\ell$ -sequences  $\sum m_i(t)2^t$  : temporal shifts of a single  $\ell$ -sequence

Why it doesn't work:

- Some things are true modulo  $q$  but not modulo  $p$

Great hope it will work, though.

## Conclusion

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- FCSR<sub>s</sub> : a non-linear primitive with many good properties
- Differential and linear bias inherent to the 2-adic structure, though

### Yet to do:

- if linear works, find an efficient way to find low-weight multiple in our case
- find counter-measures that totally breaks the 2-adic structure of FCSR<sub>s</sub>